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3ie-LIDC Seminar Series: Non-monetary incentives for doctors in Tanzania

Wednesday, March 19, 2014 - 17:00 to 18:30

Venue: Upper Meeting Room (103), LIDC, 36 Gordon Square


Speaker: J. Michelle Brock, research economist in the Office of the Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).


Eventbrite - 3ie-LIDC Seminar Series: March 2014

About the speaker:

J. Michelle Brock is a research economist in the Office of the Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Her current research focuses on how social preferences influence economic decision making. She is now developing an impact assessment study that will look at the effectiveness of capacity training for improving quality among judges in Tajikistan, and whether triggering motivation from peer-focused and quality-based reputations can incentivize professionalism among judges. Her work contributes to understanding the influence of non-monetary incentives and social preferences on behaviour in the real world and aims to establish links between the laboratory environment and the field.

Michelle completed her PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Maryland in 2011 (dissertation: “Measuring Social Preferences Among Clinicians in Tanzania: Evidence from the Lab and the Field”). Michelle's research interests include development economics, behavioural and experimental economics, agricultural and natural resource economics and applied microeconomics.


About the seminar:

In this study, we consider how gift-exchange and bonus systems function in a natural field setting by measuring the effort response of participants to non-monetary gifts
over time. We show that small unconditional gifts can increase effort in the workplace medium-term period (2 to 4 weeks), not just over short periods as has been shown with students in the laboratory. Our field experiment tests the difference in effort response to unconditional gifts delivered immediately, promised unconditional gifts delivered later, and conditional ''gifts" linked to reaching a specic performance target. We find important benefits from promising to give an unconditional gift later: participants respond positively to a promised gift twice by increasing effort when the gift is promised and again when it is received. A promised gift outperforms both the unconditional gift delivered immediately, which leads to a single positive response, and the conditional gift based on performance, which does not trigger any signicant behavioral change after the gift is delivered.

 The seminar is part of the 3ie-LIDC Seminar Series 'What works in international development'.